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Introduction 
The potential role of natural gas in the 
Western European energy market remains as 
perplexing now as it has been throughout the 
last decade. More than eight years ago I pub- 
lished a study, Natural Gas in Western Europe 
(ODELL, 1969) which drew attention to the 
availability of a potential for gas production 
which far exceeded both the plans of opera- 
tors and the expectations of governments in 
a situation in which there was no possible 
element of demand constraint on the poten- 
tial to supply. The essential element that 
could then be identified in the European gas 
market was the existence of a monopoly 
supplier seeking to achieve the highest pos- 
sible monopoly rent out of the remarkable 
phenomenon of the largest non-associated gas 
field in the non-Communist world: a gasfield, 
moreover ~ the Groningen field of the 
Netherlands ~ which lay in a concession 
allocated in its entirety to a joint enterprise 
of Shell, Esso and the Dutch government. The 
parties concerned were not only anxious to 
earn monopoly profits out of the production 
and sale of the gas as such, but were also 
jointly concerned with so restraining the sale 
of gas that their own interests in the mainten- 
ance of the markets for fuel oil and middle 
distillates would not be adversely affected. 
I suggested that the strategy of the monopo- 
lists would be undermined by competition 
from alternative supplies, notably by the 
development of gasfields in the southern part 
of the British sector of the North Sea (and 
possibly in other sectors too), and also by 
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the high-price gas market in Western Europe 
attracting surplus gas supplies from the 
Soviet Union, via pipelines from the massive 
West Siberia fields, as well as from other oil 
producing countries via the rapidly developing 
technology of liquified natural gas transport. 
In addition, I produced an alternative forecast 
of the shape of the West European gas market 
by 1975 based on these considerations. This 
forecast was an alternative to that made at 
the same time by the energy planners in the 
O.E.C.D., the E.E.C. and various national 
entities. The contrasts between these estimates, 
together with the situation as it had actually 
developed by 1975, is shown in Table 1. 
The purpose of these introductory com- 
ments is not to allocate “marks” for the 
degree to which the forecasts were right or 
wrong, but simply to indicate the tendency, 
on the part of “officialdom”, to produce 
estimates of the future supply of natural 
gas based either on a static view of the re- 
serves situation or on an extrapolation of 
specific commercial and state policies which 
stand in danger of being undermined, at any 
time, by the forces of competition and/or 
change in the general energy and economic 
environment. 
The Importance of Natural Gas 
in the West European Energy Economy 
The above statement is as true today as it was 
a decade ago: indeed, probably even more so 
than it was then, because more governments 
and more companies have got involved thus 
making the situation even more complex to 
analyse. This has had the effect of encourag- 
ing even more of the actors to pursue policies 
and to take decisions which, in essence, try 
to limit the scale and speed of development 
of the resource. In addition, there is one other 
factor which now intervenes to isolate the 
evolution of the natural gas market from con- 
siderations of supply and demand schedules 
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Table 1 
l Western Europe: 1969 estimates of natural gas production by 1975 
Country/Region 1968 Official Author’s Actual 1975 
Production Estimates Estimate (approx.) 
for 1975 for 1975 
(rn: x 10’) 
The Netherlands 
(of which Groningen) 
West Germany 
(of which on-land) 
South North Sea 
(British/Danish Sectors) 
Italy 
France 
Rest of Europe 
25.1 55 118 98 
(25.1) (55) (loo) (92) 
5.8 15 25 20 
(5.8) (15) (20) (20) 
2.3 30 38 37 
10.4 12 20 15 
8.7 6 10 11 
< 1 2 5 2 
Total 53 120 217 183 
(Estimates as % of actual) (65 o/o) (117%) 
Source : 1969 estimates from P.R. ODELL, NaturalGus in Western Europe 
(DE ERVEN F. BOHN, Haarlem, 1969). 
E.E.C. and national statistics. 
1968 and 1975 “actuals” from 
as determined by competition in the energy 
market place. This is the existence of a more 
or less general belief that natural gas is an 
inherently scarce commodity such that the 
discovery of any of it must be viewed in the 
context of saving it for the 2 1 century when, 
so it is argued, it will be needed to provide 
a little residual light and warmth in a world 
otherwise devoid of readily available and 
usable sources of energy ~~ in brief, the 
scarcity syndrome; a response to the first 
and ill-considered report of the Club of Rome 
and to the stories of gas shortages in present- 
day United States. 
No one in his right mind would advocate 
profligacy in the use of a fossil fuel, especially 
natural gas with its many advantages over the 
alternatives. But it is a far cry from such advo- 
cacy to a plea for a reasonable view on the 
development of the Western European natural 
gas market based on the following considera- 
tions: 
(a) The continent of Europe needs to reduce 
its dependence on oil imported from OPEC 
countries in the interests of security, both 
economic and political. Energy policies of 
individual countries, as well as of organisations 
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like the E.E.C. and the I.E.A., are supposed 
to be changing economies and societies in 
such a direction. Yet the existence of known 
natural gas resources in and around Western 
Europe could, if they were developed effect- 
ively, remove an additional 50 million tonnes 
a year off the region’s oil imports within the 
short space of time needed to develop the 
infrastructure to get the gas into the trans- 
mission systems. 
(b) Europe stands almost at the beginning of 
its search for hydrocarbons and so far, in 
relation to the total potential, very little has 
been achieved. It is thus inappropriate, to say 
the least, for Western Europe to approach the 
question of reserves’ decline and resource 
exhaustion in the same way as is currently 
necessary in the United States, for example, 
where the nation’s reso_uces have been tho- 
roughly explored and exploited over the last 
50 years. The appropriate lesson to be drawn 
from the U.S., is to note how quickly reserves 
build un during. the first twentv to twentv- 
five ye&s of a; effective explopation effoit. 
Table 2 
On this basis, it is possible to extrapolate a 
continuing rapid development of Western 
Europe’s gas resource base and plan depletion 
against reasonable expectations of reserves’ 
discoveries, rather than against the amount of 
gas discovered up until a particular year. 
(c) Such an approach to the evolution of a gas 
reserves’ figure does not, necessarily, have to 
be based on analogy from United States’ 
experience. It can be more soundly based on 
the prospects in view from what is already 
known about the resource base in Western 
Europe itself, or on what can, with a reason- 
able degree of confidence, be extrapolated 
from the successes, to date, of the exploration 
effort. What such a survey shows, is that there 
is a high probability that the currently proven 
and probable reserves of gas zre understated, 
and that available reserves will go on increasing 
during the foreseeable future, even after 
allowing for the gas whicn is being, and will 
continue to be, used with% the context of 
what has now become a relatively slowly 
rising demand curve. This is illustrated in 
Table 2, which also seeks to establish possible 
Western Europe: it’s “Proven” and possible natural gas resources and an estimate of their development 
by the early 1980s 
Remaining Recoverable 
reserves 
Declared Proven + As likely to 
‘Proven’ Probable be available 
+ ‘Probable’ + Possible by early 
in 1976 1980s 
(x109m3) (x109m3) (x109m3) 
Mid-1980s 
annual 
production 
potential 
(x109m3) 
Millions of 
tons of coal 
equivalent* 
(approximate) 
On-shore Netherlands 
South North Sea - 
British Sector 
South North Sea- 
Other Sectors 
On-Shore West Germany 
Austria, France, Italy, etc. 
Northern North Sea Basin- 
U.K./Norway 
Rest of European Continental 
Shelf (Ireland, Spain, etc.) 
2030 2150 2100 105 110 
550 125 1050 50 65 
440 850 1250 55 70 
310 515 450 25 30 
420 490 600 35 45 
900 1500 2500 115 145 
50 150 350 20 25 
4700 6380 8300 405 490 
Source: For 1976, various national and E.E.C./O.E.C.D. estimates. 
Estimates for the 1980s are the author’s own. 
*Conversion to coal equivalent based on known or estimated calorific values of the various gas supply sources. 
elements of controversy in contemporary 
“crystal-ball gazing” concerning the future 
supply of, and demand for, natural gas in 
Western Europe by the middle of the 1980s. 
Within the context of OPEC oil at high prices, 
there is no expectation that any natural gas 
which could be produced in Western Europe 
would fail to find markets. Obviously a 
collapse of the OPEC oil price would signifi- 
cantly alter this assumption. In that case. 
many customers in a continued free-choice 
economy in the energy sector, might then 
prefer to use imported lower cost oil, than 
pay the price necessary to cover the costs of 
producing and transporting some of the 
more expensive off-shore gas to market. Such 
a development would limit natural gas mar- 
kets throughout the continent. especially in 
industry and in power generation, and would 
clearly be most important in consuming 
regions furthest away from the main sources 
of natural gas supply. This supply is, as shown 
in Figure 1, essentially north-west European. 
For the moment, however, it is difficult to 
envisage such a fundalnertal change in the 
world oil outlook and it is possible, therefore, 
to assume that, except locally and in particu- 
lar circumstances of gas saturation of specific 
markets (e.g. the residential sector market 
in the Netherlands or, increasingly, in large 
parts of the U.K.), there are unlikely to be 
effective demand restraints imposed through 
economic factors on the expansion of the 
natural gas industry. Such an assumption is, 
of course, dependant on the absence of a 
long-lived economic depression in Western 
Europe. 
Neither is it reasonable to conclude that there 
will be really significant political/environmental 
constraints, except in the case of limitations 
on the use of gas in electricity power stations. 
(These restraints, incidentally, are produced 
by the belief that it is wasteful to use gas as 
the energy input into centralised electricity 
generating stations where only 35 per cent of 
the input fuel is converted into useful energy, 
the rest being dispersed into the atmosphere 
or in the cooling water.). Finally, neither is 
there a high probability that the necessary 
infrastructure to transport and distribute gas 
cannot be built. In this aspect, however, 
one does approach much clcser to the ques- 
tion of production limitatior s, particularlv in 
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respect of associated gas from oilfields. This 
possibility will be considered later in this 
paper as part of an examination of the supply 
side of the equation. 
Overall, however, it is difficult to foresee 
any likely demand limitation on the use of 
natural gas in Western Europe for at least 
the next ten years. Its advantages as a source 
of energy are well-known and generally recog- 
nised and its incorporatjon into the energy 
economy at the maximum rate of develop- 
ment that the expansion of the production 
potential allows, remains now, as it did in 
1969, a function of the geography of its 
supply and the location of energy demand. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 which I first 
used in my 1969 study, with the following 
note of explanation: 
“IH both the U.S. arzd the USSR 
the lnui~i rFzcrgJ~ conslrnlir~g ureas 
arc rem0 te jYon2 Fluturul gas supplies 
and despite these ,facts ofgeogruph.~~ 
gus has bc~conie u prejkrred jitd ill 
both countrim Within Wtjs terri 
Europ, 011 the otlzer hUFld. the 
Fwjor supplies of‘ Frutirrul gus u-t> 
in the hem-t of t/w urcus oj’heaviest 
crlerg.Ji cOFlSlmlptiOFl. Otht)r thiFlgS 
being equal, this sitlratiou shordtl 
t’nsure the Fwst rupiti dtwlopFmF1 t 
and u tilisution possiblt~ of’ WCS tt’r}l 
Luropeau gus wittl coFkseyiwrlt 
cFlhuFlceiZ ecorlo~~iic admltugc5 ,fhr 
the COFltiFWtl t’s t’Flc’rg_l’ Mars. ” 
(ODELL, 1969, p. 9). 
The continuing basic validity of this earlier 
observation on gas in Western Europe is not in 
doubt: though there are some constraints on 
its manifestation because, in the Western 
European context, “other things have not 
been equal”. For example, as was mentioned 
earlier, there have been institutional (mono- 
polistic) restraints on the production of 
Dutch natural gas. Now, almost a decade later, 
one can note a major difference between 
the production potential, which the resource 
base development appears to indicate should 
be possible by 1985, and the figures which 
“officialdom” this time in the shape of 
the latest O.E.C.D. figures for energy supply 
and demand in Western Europe to 1985 
(O.E.C.D., 1977) believes will be achieved 
(set Table 3). The 0.E.C.D. estimates of 
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Mam flows of lndlgenous gas 
ProductIon potential Maln Flows of Imported gas 
In milllards of m’ - - From North Africa by LNG tankers 0 Terminals 
____* From North Africa by trans-Medrterranean ptpelines 
--- From the USSR by prpelines 
Figure 1 
The geography of Western Europe’s potential supplies of natural gas in the early 1980s. 
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Figure 2 
-- 
UNITED STATES 
-J . . - 
Reserves at the end of 1972 
150” rr,mll,nrl, II, ’ 
ETH RLA$S 
if 
BY LOCATION 
The location of’ West European gas production in relation to energy demand centres compared with Ihe 
United States’ and Soviet Union’s situations. 
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Table 3 
l O.E.C.D. forecasts of changes in energy consumption in Western Europe 1974-1985 
1974 1985 
Energy Use Reference Accelerated Policy Case 
Quantity % of Total Quantity % of Total % Increase Quantity % of Total % Increase 
Energy over 1974 over 1974 
Oil (mill.b/d) 
Natural Gas 13.3 56% 18.0 53% 36% 14.6 45% 10% 
(m3 x 109) 174.4 13% 311.8 15% 79% 341.9 18% 97% 
(of which W. European 
Production) (157.7) (11%) (228.9) (11%) (45 Vo) (257.9) (13%) (63 070) 
Coal (mill. tons) 467.9 27% 516.0 20% 10% 552.6 23% 18% 
Primary Electricity 1426.3 4% 2593.0 12% 82% 2528.0 14% 77% 
(terawatt hr./yr.) 
Total Energy Use 1159 - 1704.4 - 47% 1619.2 - 39% 
(mill. tons oil equiv.) 
Source: O.E.C.D., The OutlookforEnergy to 1985, Paris, 1977. 
229-258 X lo9 m3 of gas production should 
be compared with the potential for a produc- 
tion of over 400 X lo9 m3 which emerges 
from the analysis shown in Table 2. 
It is not that the O.E.C.D. figures for the 
future production of natural gas are so very 
pessimistic when compared with the 1974 
base. As Table 3 shows, within the context 
of an expected 47 per cent increase in energy 
use in Western Europe over the period 1974- 
85, the O.E.C.D. ‘reference case’ allows for a 
natural gas production increase of 45 per cent, 
and for one of over 63 per cent in its “accele- 
rated policy” case, which contains as one of 
its central elements, a stimulated level of 
natural gas production. However, the expec- 
tation of 1985 production levels of 229 and 
2.58 X lo9 m3 respectively, contrasts strongly 
with the estimated production potential from 
the still rapidly developing resource base. 
Indeed, as is shown in Table 4, the difference 
between what is officially expected and what 
I estimate to be possible, is of the same 
order of magnitude as the difference which 
existed between the estimates made in 1969 
for production levels by 1975 (see Table 
1). In both cases the official view indicates 
an increase in indigenous production which 
is no more than 40 per cent of the increase 
which could be sustained by full exploi- 
tation of the resources. It would be tempt- 
ing to speculate that history, in this respect, 
is simply being given a chance to repeat 
itself. Indeed, one can argue that the same 
behavioural characteristics of official fore- 
casters of the natural gas sector of the West 
European economy are again at work, in 
terms of their inability, or unwillingness, 
to think in dynamic enough terms about the 
development of the gas resource base under 
the stimulus of an open-ended demand. 
Alternatively, one could argue that O.E.C.D., 
as a multi-national energy planning agency, 
is most influenced in its published forecasts 
by the reticence of member governments to 
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commit their countries to the maximum pos- 
sible production of natural gas. This is because 
such a commitment implies either too large a 
rate of export to neighbouring countries do 
creating possible uncertainty over the likely 
availability of supplies of gas for domestic 
markets into the 21 century), or, even more 
simply, too high a rate of production when 
set against other national policy decisions. 
Such decisions may, as a matter of principle, 
simply seek to curb the rate of development 
of hydro-carbons, or they may be related to 
pre-existing plans for other sectors of the 
national energy economy (viz. coal, nuclear 
power). which are supported by powerful 
pressure groups that would not wish to see 
these other sectors under-mined by the 
prospect of too much gas. 
It is, indeed, to one or other of these factors 
that one has to turn in order to find ,an 
adequate explanation for the continued 
under-estimating of the potential for indi- 
genous natural gas in the Western European 
economy: rather than to really serious doubts 
over the size of the resource base which could 
be developed, or to equally serious doubts 
over the ability of the industry to produce 
and deliver the commodity, even from the 
adverse environments of the northern parts 
of the North Sea. 
Table 4 summarises, by country, the dif- 
ferences between the O.E.C.D. “Reference” 
and “Accelerated” cases, on the one hand, 
and the production potential estimates 
previously listed in Table 2, on the other. 
The Netherlands, the U.K. and Norway are, 
in all cases, the dominant suppliers. The 
differences in the estimates for these coun- 
tries are thus critical in the analysis of the 
overall situation. Before dealing with these 
in detail, it is worth observing that in no 
other country is there an official expectation 
that the 1985 production levels will owe 
anything to discoveries which have not yet 
been made, other than relatively small dcve- 
lopments in reserves which will be necessary 
to maintain production levels in countries 
like France and Austria. This is truly remark- 
able, given that every country on the list 
plans an active exploration programme for 
natural gas in potentially petroliferous regions 
in which there must be some hope of success, 
for otherwise no company or state entity 
would be willing to invest. A situation in 
which none of the hopes are realised is 
unbelievable, but illustrates nicely one of the 
basic points made earlier about the failure 
of Western European governments to respond 
to the well-known dynamics of resource 
exploration and exploitation. However. the 
difference between the estimates for all 
Table 4 
l Western Europe: 1977 estimates of natural gas production by 1985 
Country/Region 1976 Production O.E.C.D. Estimates 
Reference Case Accelerated Case 
(in milliards - lo’- of m3) 
Author’s Estimates 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Norway 
West Germany 
Italy 
l’rance 
Spain/Portugal 
Denmark 
95 92 111 146 
40 50 50 105 
30 40 65 
19 20 20 20 
c. 1s 17.5 17.5 20 
c. 10 8 x 12 
6.5 6.5 10 
2.5 2.5 5 
Ireland 
Austria 
Total 
Sources: 
1.3 1.3 I 1) 
c. 2 1.3 1.3 2 
~181 229 258 405 
O.E.C.D. estimates from that Organisation’s publication, The Outlook for Energ_v to 1985. 
Paris, 1977. The author’s estimates are based on production potential from gas reserves al- 
ready discovered or likely to be available by 1980 so that there is time for the necessary pro- 
duction/transportation infrastructure to be built, See Fig. I for a map of the author’s estimate 
of supply patterns by the early 1980s. 
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Table 5 
l Natural gas resources of the Southern North Sea Basin (excluding associated gas) 
Total number of Gas Discoveries 
Number of Discoveries Declared as Gas Fields 
Governments’ Declaration of Remaining Proven 
Gas Reserves (109m3) 
Number of Fields in Production 
Other Fields with announced Production Plans 
Current (1976) Annual Production (109m3) 
Estimate of 1980 Production from Fields currently 
on production or in development (109m3) 
Likely Remaining Reserves for all fields in each 
sector at summed 90% probability (109m3) 
1980s Production Potential with Full Exploitation 
of the already discovered reserves (109m3) 
Dutch 
Sector 
51 
11 
322* 5521 - 
2 7 
8 - - 
c.3 CA0 
c.10 c.42 - 
lOOO+ 
40+ 50+ 2-3 
British 
Sector 
German 
Sector 
31 3 
15 
1050 + 50+ 
Notes: * Arithmetic total of “proven” reserves of declared fields. 
Based on all discoveries made and not just on declared fields. 
Based on 20 - 25 year depletion periods for the fields. 
these minor producers together amounts to 
less than 30 X IO9 m3 by 1985. By contrast, 
the market for gas at prices which Dutch 
consumers now consider to be extraordinarily 
for the Netherlands, the U.K. and Norway, high (domestic gas prices in the Netherlands 
the difference in the estimates is, in each have more or less quadrupled over the last 
case, at least that great. 3 years). 
As far as the Netherlands is concerned the 
discrepancy between the estimates is largely 
a function of contrasting expectations con- 
cerning the off-shore potential, though there 
is also a component relating to my expecta- 
tion that the possible decline of production 
from the giant on-shore Groningen field will 
be more than made up by the exploitation 
of new on-shore resources which are now 
being found in the Netherlands as a result of 
an active exploration effort. The ‘gap’ in the 
interpretation of the offshore situation is, 
however, more important and emerges out of 
the information set out in Table 5 and Figure 
3. These show that the southern North Sea 
is full of gasfields and discoveries. About 30 
are shown in the Dutch sector on the map, 
whilst the more recently compiled informa- 
tion in Table 5, indicates 5 1 discoveries. Thus, 
the official figure of a production of only 10 
milliard m3 a year by 1985 is almost ludi- 
crously low, even based, as it is, only on gas 
to be produced from the small number of 
officially declared fields. Yet in 1977, explo- 
ration for new gas fields in the Dutch sector 
seems likely to reach a record level as com- 
panies at last respond to the opportunity of 
Indeed, given information now available, and 
that is little enough given the high degree of 
secrecy maintained in respect of Dutch gas 
reserves, and what one can confidently extra- 
polate, a level of production of less than 
40-45 X IO9 m3 per annum from the Dutch 
off-shore reserves by 1985 will only be 
possible within the context of unwillingness, 
on the part of the government, to allow 
reasonable developments to go ahead. Supply, 
in other words, will be constrained by an 
even more powerful institutional force than 
the N.A.M. monopoly over Groningen pro- 
duction in 1969. 
For the U.K. the situation is rather different 
and somewhat more complex. Three main 
factors are involved. Firstly, developments 
in the British sector of the southern North 
Sea (see Figure 3) are curtailed by the lack of 
incentives to the companies which have so 
far discovered a large number of fields in the 
area. Any gas from these fields has to be sold 
“at the beach” to the British Gas Corporation 
and, as it is not prepared, or not allowed, to 
pay a price which enables the companies to 
meet the opportunity costs on the investments 
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Figure 3 
l oil and gas fields and discoveries in the Southern Basin of the North Sea Oil province (see Figure 5 for the 
key to the symbols on the map). 
required for the development of new fields, 
or even for the development of additional 
reserves from fields already in production, 
exploitation is not takingplace and so reserves 
remain unproven and unused. This gas, 
together with that under the adjacent Dutch 
sector of the south North Sea, currently 
constitutes Western Europe’s lowest-cost 
energy resource potential. Due to quirks of 
both Dutch and British policy, the benefits 
to be gained from its development are being 
foregone. 
Secondly, the U.K.‘s Gas Corporation tied 
itself, some years ago, to an open-ended com- 
mitment (both in quantity and price terms) to 
buy natural gas from the large Frigg field 
beneath Norwegian waters.’ (See Figure 4). 
’ The reason for accepting such a commitment on 
the part of the B.G.C. in the light of lower cost 
gas availability from the south North Sea basin 
and a high expectation of gas reserves being dis- 
covered in British waters further north (as has 
now happened) ~ has never been satisfactorily 
explained: it seems to lie in the belief, by the 
former Chairman of the Corporation, that he was 
dealing with a scarce commodity and was con- 
cerned that he would not be able to cover his 
forward sales. This reasoning also explains why 
the B.G.C. stopped trying to sell gas to new 
customers ~~~ indeed, even refused to supply new 
customers at the same time. These mistakes 
have cost the B.G.C. dearly in respect of both its 
supply costs and its sales revenues. 
Both the cost of this new gas and its annual 
availability, (at least 15 X lo9 m3 per year, 
which adds about 35 per cent to the present 
level of supply), creates cause for concern 
over the ability of the Gas Corporation to 
market it successfully. This arises because the 
Corporation is well aware that it cannot 
expect to be allowed to sell any gas for elec- 
tricity generation because its use would upset 
the one secure market for British coal. Thus, 
in concentrating on the marketing problem 
for Frigg gas (which, of course. imposes 
immediate and near-future cash-flow prob- 
lems for the Corporation), it has to be less 
than fully enthusiastic about the rapid deve- 
lopment of the even greater new production 
potential from the northern part of the 
British sector of the North Sea. Here many 
new oilfields with high gas oil ratios have 
been discovered so opening up the possibility 
of high annual rates of associated gas produc- 
tion by the early 1980s. 
This leads on to the third factor involved in 
creating the apparent unwillingness, on the 
part of the U.K., to declare its production 
potential for 1985 at a higher figure than the 
50 X IO9 m3 designated in the O.E.C.D. 
study. It concerns the expensive question of 
the development of a multi-user pipeline 
system for collecting associated gas from the 
30 or so north North Sea oilfields with 
collectable quantities of natural gas (see 
Figure 5). This is partly a matter of expensive 
technology per se, but it is also a matter of 
politics, given the present Labour govem- 
ment’s insistence that the operation should 
mainly be a state enterprise so that the 
private sector companies involved cannot be 
certain that they will achieve an adequate 
return on the investment they are required 
to put up. Detailed studies on the project 
are already under way and though urgency 
has been indicated, the required studies may 
be a way of buying time so that an appropriate 
policy can emerge. This is, however, not only 
time which may give the U.K. Gas Corporation 
a little breathing space for its new marketing 
efforts,but also time that may be expensively 
bought, either at the cost of oil production 
which has to be foregone, or of the associated 
gas that has to be flared.* 
Indeed, so great are the difficulties involved 
when new supplies of British North Sea gas 
are viewed solely in a British context, that it 
appears self-evident that the best solution 
must lie in the U.K. linking its gas transmis- 
sion system to that of the mainland ofwestern 
Europe, i.e. across the Channel into France 
and/or Belgium. And yet this solution is, in 
itself, a problem because of the idea that 
the U.K. should not commit itself to long- 
term gas supply contracts for other member 
countries of the E.E.C.. The British govem- 
ment once before, in 1971, refused to allow 
British gas (from the Viking field in the 
southern part of the North Sea) to be sold 
abroad. Even now, in spite of E.E.C. legisla- 
tion which formally forbids discrimination 
between E.E.C. customers for any product 
from a member country, it seems likely that a 
similar decision would again be made. In the 
meantime, the potential for natural gas pro- 
duction from the U.K. will probably be 
restrained again, as in the case of the Nether- 
lands, largely for institutional rather than 
sound economic or strategic reasons. 
This discussion has left until last a considera- 
tion of the Norwegian situation with regard to 
its gas producing potential. In respect of this, 
the O.E.C.D. forecasts specify the greatest 
proportional difference between the 1985 
“Reference” case and the “Accelerated 
* The Dept. of Eflergy’s announcement at the end 
of June 1977 that part of the Brent oilfield must 
be closed down until associated gas production 
can be collected nicely illustrates this point. 
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Policy” case, with the latter indicating a 33 
per cent higher availability than the former. 
Even so, the “Accelerated Policy” indicates 
so low a figure that it will take deliberately 
negative policies with reference to the poten- 
tial available for it not to be exceeded. But 
it is, of course, such policies in respect of 
hydro-carbon production levels, which epito- 
mise Norwegian attitudes towards its North 
Sea gas resources. If all considerations have to 
be evaluated in the light of the general princi- 
ple that the total production of hydro-carbons 
by Norway shall not exceed the equivalent 
of 906100 million tons of oil per year then, 
given the reserves that have been found 
already, together with what is under develop- 
ment on both the oil and gas fronts, the pro- 
duction of natural gas cannot rise above the 
30 X lo9 m3 per year level. The rest of the 
Figure 4 
l Oil and gas fields etc. in the Northern Basin of the 
North Sea. 
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Figure 5 
The North Sea oil and gas province. Fields and discoveries etc. to December 1076 and alternative possibili- 
ties for natural gas collection and delivery systems from the Northern and Central Basins. (N.B. The gas 
transport systems arc hypothetical only: they do not rcprcscnt definite plans in general or in detail as at 
March 3 1. 1977). 
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allowed hydro-carbon production “quota” 
will be absorbed by oil from Ekofisk, Statfjord 
and other fields already proven. 
I have previously commented, somewhat criti- 
cally, on this main element in Norwegian oil 
and gas policy, especially when it is seen in the 
context of a western Europe whose political 
and economic future is heavily dependent on 
greatly reducing its dependence on oil from 
the Middle East.3 I have also suggested that 
the internal Norwegian reasons for formulating 
the policy decision in 1973 have long been 
overtaken by events, particularly in respect of 
the no longer valid assumption, as used in the 
calculations of the optimal level of Norwegian 
hydro-carbons production, that all the coun- 
try’s resources would be fully employed in 
other economic activities. The decision on 
production limitation has not been formally 
reversed but there are recent indications that 
it is being seriously re-evaluated. It is not appro- 
priate to delve here into the reasons for the 
change in attitude: a change which is reflected, 
for example, in the licensing of a relatively 
large number of new blocks in the North Sea 
and in the decision, in early 1977, to allow 
exploration north of latitude 62” to begin in 
1978.4 The change, however, does open up 
the possibility of re-appraising the level of 
natural gas production that could be achieved 
by Norway by the mid-1980s. Fields still to 
be evaluated, together with those that are 
still to be discovered over the next three to 
five years, contribute to the enhanced poten- 
tial which may be conservatively put at the 
level of 6.5 X lo9 m3 as shown in Table 4. 
As much of the potential is in respect of 
associated gas, from fields such as Stattjord, 
the production decision is often a joint one 
involving oil as well as gas. Thus technical, 
rather than marketing, considerations are 
often paramount. If the gas “has” to be 
sold, rather than reinjected or flared, then 
transport considerations, particularly with 
respect to pipeline distance under water and 
the scale of the operation, may well be an 
3 See P. R. ODELL, Norway’s Oil and Europe’s 
Energy Needs; Bases for a mutually advantageous 
development policy, Financial Times Conference 
on Scandinavia and the North Sea, Oslo, 29 April 
1974. 
4 This decision, however, has been ‘put on ice’ 
pending a thorough investigation into the Ekofisk 
field “blow out” in May 1977 and for further 
study of environmental questions. 
overall determining factor for the volume 
which has to be involved. Given the location 
of Statfjord and other possible contributing 
fields, to an enhanced supply of Norwegian 
gas (see Figure 5), the quantities would 
seem likely to have to be larger rather than 
smaller. 
If a ‘Norwegian’ solution to the Norwegian 
north Sea gas potential is to be achieved, 
through the development of the northhsouth 
“spine-line” which could link a series of 
fields in Norwegian waters with Germany 
and/or Denmark (see Figure 5), then a 
delivery system with a capacity for upwards 
of 20 X lo9 m3 per annum seems likely to be 
required in order to keep the unit investment 
cost down to a level which ensures the market- 
ability of the gas. This, when added toexisting 
contracts, would take Norway’s contribution 
of gas to the European market above even the 
‘Accelerated Policy’ figure in the O.E.C.D. 
report. Such a system is attractive, not only 
because of the ‘Norwegian-ness’ of the solu- 
tion, but also because it ensures entry to the 
high-gas demand areas of West Germany and 
other mainland markets, where an oil equi- 
valent price would be an acceptable formula 
for determining the gas price. 
This, however, is not true in the case of the 
alternative solution, that is, the building of 
a system of collector pipelines from the 
Norwegian fields to tie into the proposed 
multi-user trunk gas lines running from fields 
in the British sector of the north North Sea 
to the U.K. mainland. In this case Norway 
could get away with a more limited scale of 
development, but only in exchange for 
difficult negotiations with the U.K. over the 
charges to be made for the use of the British 
lines and for using the U.K. as a transit state 
if there were to be an attempt to get the 
Norwegian gas delivered to the mainland of 
Western Europe via the U.K. Not that such a 
development would be without benefits to 
the U.K. Indeed, two sets of benefits would 
arise. First, there would be the general added 
value to the British economy of this service 
function with,most specifically, the Norwegian 
throughput of gas in the British trunk lines 
more or less guaranteeing the short-term 
viability of the multi-user line project. Second, 
the U.K. would benefit in terms of the 
political opening that the transhipment of 
Norwegian gas to France, or Belgium, would 
give to a British government so that it could 
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‘seli’ the idea that some British gas could 
also move across the Channel, at both low 
cost and high value in terms of foreign ex- 
change earnings to the U.K. economy. 
Such Anglo-Norwegian co-operation might 
thus enable Norway to restrict its supply of 
natural gas to II level lower than appears 
to be necessary if Norway is to go it alone 
in creating the transportation system required 
to ensure the profitable development of its 
own gas resources. A decision on this may 
we11 be the main element involved in deter- 
mining whether Norway does nothing more 
than expected by the O.E.C.D. energy analy- 
sis, or whether it chooses to move to a level 
of supply by 1985 which will take its total 
production of oil and gas beyond the pre- 
viously determined upper-limit of the 1973 
plan. This choice by Norway also depends 
on its own institutional response to the 
challenge and opportunities presented by the 
natural gas markets of Western Europe. the 
same sort of choice as has already been shown 
to be the case in respect of the other two 
main suppliers of this form of energy to 
Europe’s needs and demands. 
Conclusion 
The Netherlands, Britain and Norway thus 
have much in common in their near-future 
relationships with the rest of Western Europe, 
partic~llarly in terms of their ability and their 
responsibility to determine just how inde- 
pendent the region can become from O.P.E.C. 
oil in the 1980s. Let us assume that all three 
decide to pursue policies that maximise, 
rather than restrict, the production of their 
large natural gas reserves. Further. let us 
assume that all the additional natural gas will 
substitute oil that the O.E.C.D. currently 
expects will have to be imported from the 
O.P.E.C. countries. Then, within the context 
of the figures in the O.E.C.D. report on West 
Europe’s total energy demand. and taking 
into account the total supplies of other sorts 
of energy available in Europe in 1985, the 
need for oil imports would fall from O.E.C.D.‘s 
calculated I 1.2 million b/d to only a little 
over one third of this amount (roLlgflly 4 
million b/d), so making Western Europe, to 
all intents and purposes, independent of 
O.P.E.C. for its supplies of essential energy. 
This much, in respect of Europe’s energy 
needs, is at stake when decisions on future 
levels of natural gas production are taken by 
Norway, Britain and the Netherlands. 
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